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According to Higgins's (1987) self-discrepancy theory, an individual's selfesteem is based upon fulfilling one's self-expectations or the expectations of significant
others (e.g., spouse or parent). Failure to live up to these expectations results in greater
levels of depression, anxiety, and lower self-esteem.
Previous research has also found that those low in Snyder and Gangestad's (1986)
self-monitoring construct are more influenced by their own expectations, while those
high in self-monitoring are more influenced by others' expectations. It was predicted that
Christians who are low in self-monitoring will have greater levels of depression and
anxiety and lower self-esteem if they fail to fulfill their own religious expectations,
whereas Christians who are high in self-monitoring would have greater levels of
depression and anxiety and lower self-esteem if they fail to meet the religious
expectations of significant others.
As predicted, for low self-monitors actuakideal religious self-discrepancies led to
increased negative affect, but actuakother discrepancies did not. For high self-monitors,
however, neither actuakideal nor actuakother self-discrepancies led to increased negative
affect.

VI

The Effects of Self-Monitoring and Religious
Self-Discrepancies on Negative Affect
Much of the research examining interactions between religious motivation and
low-self esteem or depression has yielded inconclusive results. Therefore, further
research is necessary to examine why some very religious individuals are happy, healthy,
content, and well-adjusted while other equally religious individuals are depressed and
despairing. For this study, Higgins's (1987) self-discrepancy theory and Snyder and
Gangestad's (1986) construct of self-monitoring were used to predict anxiety and
depression among Christians. According to self-discrepancy theory, individuals' selfesteem is based on fulfilling either one's self-expectations or the expectations of
significant others (e.g., parents or spouse). When one fails to fulfill the expectations that
are more important, greater anxiety, depression, and low self-esteem result. Previous
research has also shown that self-expectations are more important for those who are low
in self-monitoring, while others' expectations are attended to more by those high in selfmonitoring. From these joint considerations, it was predicted that Christians who are low
in self-monitoring would experience greater depression and anxiety if they see
themselves as failing to fulfill their religious self- expectations, whereas Christians who
are high in self-monitoring would have greater anxiety and depression if they think they
are not fulfilling the religious expectations significant others hold for them.
Self-Discrepancy

Theory

Higgins's (1987) self-discrepancy theory describes the differences between the
characteristics a person has, desires, and feels should be possessed. Two main dimensions
comprise self-discrepancy theory: the domains of the self and the standpoints of the self.

1

2
The domains of the self are divided into three categories. The "actual self" refers
to these attributes, characteristics, beliefs, etc. that an individual believes are actually
possessed. The "ideal self' are the attributes, characteristics, beliefs, etc. that an
individual wishes to ideally possess. The third category, the "ought self," consists of
attributes, characteristics, beliefs, etc. that an individual believes should be possessed
(Higgins, 1987).
The second dimension of self-discrepancy theory, the standpoints on the self,
consists of the own standpoint and the other standpoint. The own standpoint is one's own
personal perception of oneself. The other standpoint is one's perception of how important
other persons, such as a parent or spouse, see that individual (Higgins, 1987).
By organizing his theory into these two dimensions, Higgins (1987) derived six
possible ways that a person can see oneself: the actual/own, ideal/own, ought/own,
actual/other, ideal/other, and ought/other perspectives. Any one person can have or be
influenced by one or more of these six points of view. To simplify these six viewpoints
on the self, Higgins describes the actual/own and actual/other, as a person's "selfconcept,"' either what one sees in one's self (actual/own) or what someone thinks other
people see in him or her (actual/other). The remaining four viewpoints are called "selfguides." These self-guides are used to direct a person's life. An individual will not
necessarily use all four self-guides. Some will be more influenced by the ideal selves and
others by the ought selves, some more by the own perspective and others by the other
perspective. In the end, self-discrepancy theory essentially states that people are
motivated by their self-guides to reach a state of congruency between their individual
self-concepts and their individual self-guides.
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A self-discrepancy occurs when there is a difference between a person's selfconcept (actual self, own or other) and self-guide (ought or ideal, own or other). Higgins
(1987) states that these self-discrepancies create emotional disturbance and that the larger
the self-discrepancy, the greater the emotional upset. He differentiates between the
specific type of disturbance held by each type of self-guide (ideal or ought) by
hypothesizing that self-discrepancies from ideal self-guides create dejection or
depression-related disturbances, while self-discrepancies from ought self-guides lead to
anxiety or agitation. His reasoning is that ideal self-guided people may feel as though
they have not or will not achieve a certain standard. Therefore, they may feel depressed
as a result of having disappointed themselves or important others and having missed
positive outcomes that would have resulted from achieving that standard. When ought
self-guided people, on the other hand, feel as though they have not achieved a certain
standard, they may feel anxiety due to anticipated punishment or other impending
negative outcomes as a result of not having achieved that standard.
Higgins (1987) states that these emotional disturbances may not occur as long as
the individual with a large self-discrepancy is unaware of that discrepancy. It is the
awareness that one has not achieved what one has wished for or felt obligated to achieve
that creates the emotional discomfort. "The greater the magnitude and accessibility of a
particular type of self-discrepancy possessed by an individual, the more the individual
will suffer the kind of discomfort associated with that type of self-discrepancy" (Higgins,
1987, p. 324).
Self-discrepancies most often have been assessed by one of two measures. The
Selves Questionnaire developed by Higgins, Bond, Klein, and Strauman (1986) is most
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widely used. The Selves Questionnaire asks participants to list attributes for the actual,
ideal, and ought selves. Test administrators then compare the attributes from the actualself list to the attributes in the ideal-self and ought-self lists using a thesaurus to examine
how well attributes match each other and assign a score to each attribute based upon the
quality of that match. Discrepancy scores are then assigned by taking the difference
between the total score on the actual-self list and the ideal-self or ought-self lists. The
higher the discrepancy score, the greater the difference between the individual's selfconcept and self-guide. Hoge and McCarthy (1983) developed a second measure on
which participants answer an eight-item scale with Likert-type responses assessing
various actual-self and ideal-self attributes. Respondents indicate how true of themselves
each of the items is by giving a score of 1 (not at all true) to 6 (very true). One openended item is included at the end of the scale for respondents to indicate further important
attributes not addressed in the first eight items. Discrepancy scores are assigned by taking
the difference of real-self and ideal-self ratings for each item and then calculating an
average total discrepancy across all nine items.
Higgins and his colleagues have done a number of studies testing his hypotheses
of self-discrepancies and the corresponding emotional disturbances. The results of the
studies (Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985; Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1987; Higgins,
et ah, 1986; Strauman & Higgins, 1987) are summarized by Higgins's (1987) and lend
considerable support for his theory of self-discrepancy.
Strauman and Higgins (1988) again examined self-discrepancies in two studies.
They found, in support of the theory, that actual/own versus ideal/own discrepancies were
uniquely related to dejection, frustration, and anger towards self and that actual/own
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versus ought/other discrepancies were uniquely related to agitation and anger at others, as
well as resentment (Study 1). They also found that social anxiety was related to
actual/own versus ought/other discrepancies and that depressive symptoms were related
to actual/own versus ideal/own discrepancies best fit the results obtained (Study 2).
Moretti and Higgins (1990) examined the ability of self-discrepancies to predict
self-esteem. Participants filled out the Selves Questionnaire (Higgins et al., 1986) and
Hoge and McCarthy's (1983) measure of self-discrepancy. Self-discrepancy scores were
obtained on both measures and correlated with participants' scores on two measures of
self-esteem.
Significant correlations between actuakideal discrepancies on the Selves
Questionnaire and both measures of self-esteem were observed, but similar significant
relationships were not found for the Hoge and McCarthy scale and self-esteem. These
findings imply that the Selves Questionnaire is a superior instrument for predicting selfesteem levels resulting from self-discrepancies. The better predictability of the Selves
Questionnaire appears to be because its discrepancies are related to attributes named by
the individual instead of from attributes named by another person. While there was no
significant correlation found between actual-ought discrepancies and self-esteem, these
results indicate that discrepancies derived from Higgins's (1987) measure of selfdiscrepancy are better predictors of self-esteem level than Hoge and McCarthy's (1983).
Self Monitoring
Whereas self-discrepancies examine the differences between what an individual is
and wants to be (whether the ought or ideal self), self-monitoring examines differences in
how people portray themselves to others. Snyder and Gangestad's (1986) self-
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monitoring construct was developed at much the same time as Higgins's self-discrepancy
theory. Snyder and Gangestad, like Higgins, maintain that each person has a type of inner
self that is comprised of what a person actually believes and feels, like Higgins's actual
self. In addition to that inner self, most people also have multiple selves that they
demonstrate in social settings, the way an actor moves from one role to another,
depending on the script. The extent to which each person controls, or monitors, the self
that is seen by the public is called self-monitoring (Snyder, 1987).
High self-monitors are typically very concerned about the images or selves they
allow others to see. They tend to tailor the way they act, or the self they demonstrate, to
their social situation. They most often act in a way to conform to the expectations of
others around them. According to Snyder (1987), most people monitor their projected self
to some degree, but for high self-monitors especially, doing so becomes a core way of
living. On the other hand, low self-monitors are more concerned that the self they
demonstrate in public is congruent with their true inner self. They are much less apt to
conform to the expectations of a social situation, especially if those expectations are
contrary to their own beliefs.
Snyder and Gangestad's (1986) Self-Monitoring Scale consists of 18 items, such
as, "I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others." They are presented as
statements about how an individual's life is led, and individuals respond whether each
statement is true or false about their lives. The items are designed to assess different
situationally appropriate methods of presenting the self, such as assessing how much
attention is paid to monitoring social cues, controlling expressive behaviors, and shifting
from one self to another when changing social situations.
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Combining Self-Monitoring and Self-Discrepancy

Theory

Gonnerman, Parker, Lavine, and Huff (2000) examined the extent to which self
monitoring and standpoints on the self moderate the affective states of individuals in
terms of discrepancies between actuakideal and actuakought selves. The researchers'
hypotheses were that, for low self-monitors, only self-discrepancies from the own
standpoint would be significantly related to depression and anxiety. For high selfmonitors, only self-discrepancies from the other standpoint would be significantly related
to depression and anxiety. The expectations were based upon the idea that if high selfmonitors are most concerned about how they portray themselves to others, they would be
most concerned about discrepancies from the other standpoint, while if low self-monitors
are most concerned about reflecting their own ideals, they would be most concerned with
discrepancies from their own standpoint.
Participants were divided into either high or low self-monitoring categories,
depending on whether their score on Snyder and Gangestad's (1986) Self Monitoring
Scale fell above or below the sample's median split. In addition to filling out the selfmonitoring instrument, participants also filled out Higgins's Selves Questionnaire, and
two self-discrepancy scores (own and other perspectives) were calculated for each
individual. After self-discrepancy scores were determined, the participants filled out a
number of measures assessing anxiety and depression.
Gonnerman et ah (2000) evaluated the relationship between self-discrepancy and
depression for the low and high self-monitors from both the own and other standpoints.
The results confirmed the hypotheses. Specifically, low self-monitors had a significant
relationship between discrepancies and depression only in the own standpoint, indicating
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that low self-monitors are concerned with not living up to their own ought and ideal
expectations. Results further indicated that high self-monitors had a stronger relationship
between self-discrepancy and depression and anxiety from the other standpoint than from
the own standpoint, indicating that high self-monitors are more concerned with not living
up to others' expectations.
Given the established relationships for self-monitoring and self-discrepancies with
depression and anxiety, it was expected that similar self-discrepancies in an individual's
religious beliefs and motivations would similarly be related to depression and anxiety.
Religious Beliefs
Batson, Schoenrad, and Ventis's (1993) Doctrinal Orthodoxy was designed to
measure one's belief in core Christian doctrines. The scale consists of 12 statements such
as "I believe Jesus Christ is the Divine Son of God," to which the individual responds in a
Likert-type format from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5). A measure of
orthodoxy will be used in the current study.
Religious

Motivation

Gordon Allport (1950) introduced the terms immature and mature religion to
describe the way that religious individuals incorporate religion into their lives. Allport
contended that as people grow from childhood to adulthood, they generally move from
immaturity to maturity in most areas (intellectual, emotional, physical). However, not
everyone grows in all areas. Intellectual and emotional growth do not necessarily
accompany physical growth, and this is especially the case with religion. For people who
are religious for most of their lives, the immature religion of childhood is generally one
that is comforting and familiar, providing a basis of stability for life. As people age, they
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often find the religion of childhood to be sufficient for their purposes. It is difficult and
uncomfortable to challenge long held beliefs, especially when those beliefs provide the
holder with positive rewards such as security or consolation. Therefore, growth of
religious sentiment, as Allport calls it, may be stifled and remain immature.
Mature religion on the other hand is one that " . . . comes a b o u t . . . by the desire
that this sentiment shall not suffer arrested development. . . ." (Allport, 1950, p. 59).
Mature religion is cultivated to reflect the positive experiences of the person holding
those beliefs. It is not merely self-gratifying. Rather, a mature religion is one that allows
the holder to expand interests to concepts beyond the self. It allows viewing of oneself
objectively, in perspective to the rest of the world and seeing oneself as others do. It also
unifies all experiences of the person into a whole; that is, it affects every aspect of the
individual's life. Mature religion is not put into use only when it serves a purpose to the
individual. Instead of merely meeting needs or fulfilling desires, it provides a framework
by which one's life is led. It welcomes challenges and existential questions, and it allows
growth of a nature that immature religion is unable to allow.
Allport and Ross (1967) further developed the study of religious motivation by
expanding from immature and mature religion to extrinsic and intrinsic religion. The
authors began their definitions of these two terms by saying, " . . . the extrinsically
motivated person uses his [sic] religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated person lives
his [sic] religion" (p. 434; italics added). The extrinsic motivation for religion is
essentially immature. The person with extrinsically motivated religious beliefs holds
those beliefs because they provide something or because they meet certain needs, such as
security, self-assurance, or social connectedness. On the other hand, the person with
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intrinsically motivated religious beliefs embraces or internalizes those beliefs. All other
needs, as important as they may be, are considered less important than the religious
belief. Intrinsic motivation for religion is mature.
Allport and Ross's original scales for assessing these motivations were called
Extrinsic and Intrinsic Scales of Religious Orientation. They consisted of 11 statements
assessing extrinsic motivation (e.g., "What religion offers me most is comfort when
sorrows and misfortune strike.") and 9 statements reflecting intrinsic motivation (e.g.,
"My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life."). Persons
responded to each item in a Likert-type manner indicating "I definitely disagree" to '"I
definitely agree" (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 436). Batson et ah (1993) slightly modified
the wording on a few of the original items in order to move the Likert-type response
choices from a 5-point scale to 9-point scale.
Gorsuch and Venable (1983) developed an age-universal scale to measure
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. They posited that the original scales were developed
for adults, and therefore were not accurate measures for the motivations of children and
adolescents. Their modified scale was found to be equally reliable and valid with children
and adolescents compared to the original scales, with wording that makes it easier for
children down to the fifth grade level to comprehend the statements on the scales.
An EBSCO search revealed that since their introduction, more than 375 published
studies have used Allport and Ross's scales, Gorsuch and Venable's scale, or other
derivations to assess how intrinsic and extrinsic motivations affect other behaviors or
attitudes. Some examples are antihomosexual sentiment among Christians (Fulton,
Gorsuch, & Maynard, 1999), religious motivation in middle-age (Kivett, 1979), religion
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and rationality (Watson, Milliron, Morris, and Hood, 1994), spiritual and psychological
well-being (Genia, 1996), and depressive symptoms (Maltby & Day, 2000).
Batson and Ventis's (1982) introduction of quest motivation created a third major
dimension in the study of religious motivation. Quest motivation, like intrinsic
motivation, is mature. It also has moved from the self-gratifying nature of immature or
extrinsic religion to a nature that grows and develops along with the individual. Batson
defined quest motivation as ".. .an open-ended, responsive dialogue..." (Batson et ak,
1993, p. 169) about religion. It is essentially an open-minded attitude toward change and
searching for the answers to the existential questions that are part of the nature of
religion. Batson & Ventis first introduced a six-item measure in 1982. McFarland (1989)
developed a 10-item revision of the quest scale, and Batson et ak (1993) produced a 12item revised scale to measure quest motivation. Many researchers have since
incorporated the quest dimension into their study of religious motivation, including
studies of authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism with quest (Altemeyer &
Hunsberger, 1992), and relationships of religious attitudes to religious orientations
(Kristensen, Pedersen, & Williams, 2001).
Religion and Self-Esteem
Most research regarding religion and self-esteem has yielded mixed results.
Smith, Weigert, and Thomas (1979) found general support for a positive correlation
between religious behavior in adolescents and self-esteem. However, Smith, et ak did not
examine the religious motivations and also found significant results in only a portion of
the sample. Most studies reviewing direct relationships between self-esteem and religious
motivation have shown few or no significant results when self-esteem was correlated
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with intrinsic or extrinsic motivation (Watson, Hood, Morris, & Hall, 1985; Watson,
Morris, & Hood, 1987; Watson, Milliron, Morris, & Hood, 1994). Also, when correlating
quest motivation with self-esteem, Watson, et al. (1985, study 1), and Watson, Morris, &
Hood (1987) found no significant relationship, although Leak et ak (1990, study 1) did
find a significant relationship between quest motivation and self-esteem (as cited in
Batson, 1993, p. 284).
Religious

Self-Discrepancies

An Internet search located only one study on the relationship between selfdiscrepancies and religion. Lilliston and Klein (1991) examined the extent to which selfdiscrepancies affect the application of religious coping strategies to personal crisis.
Participants completed the Selves Questionnaire. They responded to a series of religious
activities that they might engage in to cope with personal crisis. The results indicated that
only high actual/own:ought/own discrepancies were significantly related to religious
coping strategies. Individuals with high actuakought discrepancies from the own point of
view were more likely to engage in religious activities as a coping strategy for personal
crisis than those with high actual/own:ideal/own discrepancies. The implication is that
individuals who are more concerned with how significant others in their lives want them
to be may be more likely to use the religion of those significant others as coping tools
during personal crisis.
The Current Study
The current study combined self-discrepancy theory and self-monitoring to assess
the degree to which discrepancies between actual religious self-states and ideal or ought
religious self-guides mediate the level of self-esteem, depression, and anxiety in Christian
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individuals. No research to date to assesses how discrepancies in religious selves affect
self-esteem and depression.
Based on previous findings, two specific hypotheses were posited. First, for low
self-monitors, large discrepancies between actual religious self (motivations and beliefs)
and ideal religious selves from the own perspective will be significantly related to greater
depression and lower levels of self-esteem, but ought discrepancies from the other
perspective should not lead to depression or reduced self-esteem. Second, for high selfmonitors large discrepancies between actual religious self and ideal or ought religious
self from the other perspective will be significantly correlated with greater depression and
lower levels of self-esteem, but discrepancies from ideal religious self from one's own
perspective should not lead to depression or reduced self-esteem.
Using Amos 4.0, data were analyzed for goodness-of-fit to the structural model
presented in Figures 1 and 2. Goodness-of-fit to the model was calculated separately for
high and low self-monitors and for own and other perspectives. For high self-monitors,
the path from religious self-discrepancy to generalized negative affect was expected to be
greater for other than for own perspective. For low self-monitors, the path from religious
self-discrepancy to generalized negative affect was expected to be greater for own than
for other perspective.
This model assumed that the four measures of religious self-discrepancy from the
own perspective would yield a generalized religious own-perspective self-discrepancy
score. Similarly, it assumes that the four measures of religious self-discrepancy from the
other perspective would yield a generalized religious other-perspective self-discrepancy
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score. It also assumed that the three measures of negative affect (anxiety, depression, and
low self-esteem) would yield a general negative affect score.
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Figure 1 Hypothetical model of the effects of religious self-discrepancy (own perspective)
upon negative affect.
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Figure 2 Hypothetical model of the effects of religious self-discrepancy (other perspective)
upon negative affect.

ORTHODOX
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ANXIETY
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Method
Participants
Participants (N=227) were recruited on a volunteer basis from undergraduate and
graduate classes at a mid-sized state university. One individual did not complete the
survey and was removed from the sample, leaving 156 females and 70 males. Eightyseven percent were Caucasian, 9% African-American, and 4% Hispanic, Asian, or other
ethnicity. Eighty-seven percent of participants answered that they are Christians.
Measures
Self-Monitoring. Participants completed the revised version of the SelfMonitoring Scale (Appendix A; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) designed to place an
individual into either a high or low self-monitoring group. Gonnerman et al. (2000)
reported a reliability (Cronbach's alpha) coefficient of .70 for their sample of 294 college
students.
Self-Esteem. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Appendix B; Rosenberg. 1965) is
designed to assess a measure of global self-esteem based on a 1 Q-item, Likert-type
format. Participants are asked to respond to various questions such as "On the whole, I
am satisfied with myself," (reverse scored) or "At times I think I am no good at all," from
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). McFarland (2002) reported an alpha of .86 for
more than 200 adults and .81 for 200 college students.
Religious motivation.

Six items per scale were taken from Allport & Ross's

(1967) Religious Orientation Scales, assessing extrinsic orientation (Appendix C; Allport
& Ross, 1967) and intrinsic orientation (Appendix D; Allport & Ross, 1967). The
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participant responds to each statement by indicating to what degree the item applies to his
or her life. The measure of quest orientation (Appendix E; Batson et al., 1993), also
reduced to six items, was responded to in the same manner as the extrinsic and intrinsic
measures. Batson et al. (1993) reported an alpha of .72 for the extrinsic measure, .83 for
the intrinsic measure, and .78 for the quest measure on a group of 424 undergraduate
students, using each of the full scales.
Orthodoxy. The Doctrinal Orthodoxy Scale (Appendix F; Batson et al., 1993),
also reduced to six items, was given to measure one's belief in traditional religious
doctrines, primarily from the Christian perspective. Batson et al. reported an alpha of .91
for a group of 424 undergraduate students, using the full scale.
Religious Behavior. A four-item measure of the frequency of religious behavior
(Appendix G) was added to assess how often each individual engages in the activities of
reading the Bible, praying, attending church, and a general statement assessing the
individual's degree of religiosity.
Depression. The depression subscale of the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL;
Appendix H; Derogatis, Lipman, Rickels, Uhlenhuth, & Covi. 1974) is an eleven-item
scale assessing an individual's recent experience of depression-related symptoms.
Participants respond to each item in a Likert-type format from 1 (not at all) to 4
{extremely). Derogotis et al. (1974) reported an alpha of .86 for three separate clinical
samples.
Anxiety. The anxiety subscale of the HSCL (Appendix 1: Derogatis et ak, 1974) is
a seven-item scale assessing an individual's recent experience of anxiety-related
symptoms. Participants respond to each item in a Likert-type format from 1 (not at all) to
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4 (extremely). Derogatis et al. (1974) reported an alpha of .84 for three separate clinical
samples.
Procedure
Participants completed a series of questionnaires consisting of the SelfMonitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
(Rosenberg, 1965), abbreviated (six-item) versions of the Intrinsic Scale of Religious
Orientation (Allport & Ross, 1967), Extrinsic Scale of Religious Orientation (Allport &
Ross, 1967), Quest Scale of Religious Life Inventory (Batson, et al., 1993), Doctrinal
Orthodoxy scale (Batson, et al., 1993), and Religious Behavior Scale, as well as the
depression and anxiety subscales of the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL; Derogatis,
Lipman, Rickels, Uhlenhuth, & Covi, 1974). Abbreviation of the extrinsic, intrinsic,
quest, and orthodoxy religious measures was done in the interest of shortening the time
required of a participant to complete the questionnaire. Choices for items included in the
abbreviated forms were based on face validity, selecting the six items from each scale
that appear to best represent its content. Participants also answered four items assessing
the frequency of religious behavior.
The participants answered the Self-Monitoring Scale, Rosenberg Self-Esteem
Scale, Doctrinal Orthodoxy Scale, and Depression and Anxiety Subscales once each. The
participants answered the religious scales three times each: once as they actually see
themselves, once as they would ideally like to be, and once as they believe significant
others (parents, loved ones) would like them to be. The scales were answered in the order
of the Self-Monitoring Scale, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, the four religious scales
and religious behavior questions answered three times in the order of actual self, ideal
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self, and other perspective, and lastly the depression and anxiety subscales. After
returning the questionnaires, the participants received appropriate debriefing as to the
purpose of their involvement.

Results
The sample was divided into high and low self-monitors based on criteria that
scores of 10 or lower on the self-monitoring section of the survey denoted low selfmonitors (n = 135) and scores of 11 or higher denoted high self-monitors (n = 91).
Analysis was then done for both high and low self-monitors for both actuakideal and
actuakother discrepancies. The decision to place the cutoff score at 10 was based on the
recommendation of Snyder and Gangestad's (1986) research that 10 is most often the
best score to set as the cutoff limit.
Self-discrepancy scores were calculated by summing the response values of each
item in each of the five religious scales for the actual, ideal, and other perspectives. The
absolute value of the difference between the actual (how one sees one's self) and ideal
(how one aspires to be) perspectives produced the actuakideal discrepancy score on any
given scale. Similarly, the absolute value of the difference between the actual and other
(how one thinks others want him or her to be) perspectives produced the actuakother
discrepancy score. Separate discrepancy scores were calculated for each of the five
religious constructs assessed (extrinsic, intrinsic, and quest motivations, orthodoxy and
religious behavior). Means, standard deviations, reliability coefficients, and correlations
among variables in each of the four study groups are provided in Table 1. All scales used
were found to be reliable, with alphas ranging from .71 to .88.
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Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliability Coefficients for Each Study Group.
M

SD

Rel. Alpha

Self Est.

40.15

6.59

.85

Self Est. - Self Esteem

Self M o n .

8.70

3.60

.71

Self M o n . - Self M o n i t o r i n g

Ext. Act.

14.07

4.85

.77

Ext. - Extrinsic Motivation

Int. A c t .

18.95

5.79

.85

Int. - Intrinsic Motivation

Qst. Act.

18.21

5.17

.79

Qst. - Quest Motivation

Orth. Act

24.48

5.96

.88

Orth. - Religious O r t h o d o x y

Beh. Act.

12.95

4.03

.83

Beh. - Religious B e h a v i o r

Ext. Id.

12.00

4.03

.79

Act. - Actual

Int. Id.

23.70

5.68

.86

Id. - Ideal (Own perspective)

Qst. Id.

16.65

5.81

.83

Oth. - Other Perspective

Orth. Id.

26.20

5.23

.85

Dep. - Depression

Beh. Id.

16.56

4.20

.88

A n x . - Anxiety

Ext. Oth.

13.05

5.47

.83

Int. O t n .

22.98

5.80

.87

Qst. Oth.

16.49

5.73

.85

Orth. Oth

25.92

5.07

.85

Beh. O t h

15.71

4.34

.88

Dep.

17.98

5.50

.84

Anx.

9.64

3.77

.88

Intercorrelations were conducted between all discrepancy scores for all groups. As
presented in Tables 2 and 3, discrepancy scores between the five religious measures
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correlated highly with each other for both the actual:ideal discrepancy (Table 2) and
actuakother discrepancy (Table 3).
Table 2
Actual:Ideal Discrepancies from the Own Perspective
Extrinsic
actuakideal
Extrinsic
actual: ideal
Intrinsic actual
ideal
Quest
actual: ideal
Orthdxy.
actual:ideal
Behaviors
actual:ideal

Intrinsic
actuakideal

Quest
actuakideal

Orthdxy
actuakideal

Behaviors
actuakideal

1.0
.54**

1.0

.27**

.45**

1.0

.47**

.60**

.40**

1.0

.41 **

•77**

.40**

.57**

1.0

Orthdxy
actuakother

Behavior
actuakother

** - Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 3
Actual: Other Discrepancies from the Other Perspective
Extrinsic
actuakother
Extrinsic
actual:other
Intrinsic
actuakother
Quest
actuakother
Orthdxy
actual:other
Behavior
actual :other

Intrinsic
actuakother

Quest
actuakother

1.0
44**

.28**

1.0
.34**

39**
.34**

1.0
.30**

.68**

32**

1.0
> j **

1.0

** - Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

In examining the correlations between discrepancy scores, it was discovered that
although all of the correlations for the quest discrepancies were significantly related to
the other four discrepancies, its coefficients were consistently lower than the correlation
coefficients of the Religious Behavior scale with the other four discrepancies (see Tables
2 and 3). It was therefore decided to substitute religious behavior in place of quest
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motivation when analyzing the data's fit to the models presented in Figures 1 and 2.
Thus, the self-discrepancies determined using the four measures of religion used in the
revised model (extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, religious orthodoxy, and frequency of
religious behaviors) loaded heavily onto the latent variable of a general religious selfdiscrepancy.
It was additionally found, as presented in Table 4 that the three measures of
negative affect were significantly correlated with each other, indicating that a generalized
negative affect exists as the path analysis model assumes.

Table 4
Measures of Negative Affect.
Self-esteem

Depression

Self-Esteem

1.0

Depression

-.41**

1.0

Anxiety

-.23**

.60**

Anxiety

1.0

** - Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

However, when analyzing the data for fit to the models presented in Figures 1 and
2, Amos 4.0 overcorrected for the anxiety and depression scales and reported an
inadmissible solution due to negative variance for the depression scale, probably due to
the high correlation between these two scales. After examining the data, it was decided
to remove the anxiety scale from the model altogether. Rationale for this was taken from
Higgins' (1987), who theorized that individuals with own perspective discrepancies are
more likely to also suffer from depressive symptoms rather than anxious symptoms.
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Low

Self-Monitors
As shown in Figure 3, for low self-monitors in the actuakideal analysis, the four

measures of religious self-discrepancy used all contributed to the latent general religious
self-discrepancy. Further, both depression and low self-esteem loaded highly on latent
general negative affect as was expected. When the data were analyzed for fit to the
revised model (with anxiety measure removed), the relationship between general
religious self-discrepancy and general negative affect was found to be highly significant,
p < .01. As presented in Figure 3, the data fit the presented model well. Three goodnessof-fit indices were used. Data constitute a good fit to a model when chi-square is not
significant, comparative goodness-of-fit (CFI) approaches 1.0, and root mean square
error of approximation (RMSEA) approaches .00.
For low self-monitors' actuakother discrepancies, the four measures of religious
self-discrepancy again all contributed to the latent general religious self-discrepancy and
depression and low self-esteem loaded highly on latent general negative affect.
However, as presented in Figure 4, when the data were analyzed for fit to the revised
model (with the anxiety measure removed), though it was found to be a good fit to the
model presented, the relationship between general religious self-discrepancy and general
negative affect was not significant. Therefore, a significant relationship was found
between religious self-discrepancy and negative affect for low self-monitors for
actuakideal discrepancies, but not for actuakother discrepancies, supporting the first
hypothesis.
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Figure 3
Actual-Ideal Discrepancy and Negative Affect for Low Self Monitors

Chi-square (6, N =135) = 6.30, p = .39, CFI = .996, RMSEA = .02
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Figure

3

Actual-Other Discrepancy and Negative Affect for Low Self Monitors

Chi-square (6, N =135) = 6.30, p = .39, CFI = .996, RMSEA = .02
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High

Self-Monitors
For high self-monitors in the actuakideal discrepancy analysis, the four measures

of religious self-discrepancy all contributed to the latent general religious selfdiscrepancy. When the data were analyzed for this group, an inadmissible solution due to
negative variance was found again for the depression measure. The self-esteem and
depression measures were again collapsed into one single measure of negative affect (the
factor scores of depression and self-esteem). Goodness-of-fit indices indicated that the
data were a perfect fit to the model presented in Figure 5 (CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .000).
However, the relationship between the negative affect and religious self-discrepancy
variables was not significant.
As shown in Figure 6, for high self-monitors in the actual:other discrepancy
analysis, the four religious measures of religious self-discrepancy all again contributed to
the latent general religious self-discrepancy. When the data were analyzed for this group,
an inadmissible solution due to negative variance was found for the depression measure.
By collapsing the self-esteem and depression measures into one single measure of
negative affect (the factor scores of self-esteem and depression), the data were analyzed
for fit to the revised model and was found to have a good fit to the model presented,
though the relationship between general religious self-discrepancy and general negative
affect was not found to be significant. Therefore, because there was no significant
relationship found between religious self-discrepancies and negative affect for high selfmonitors for either the actuakideal or actuakother discrepancies, the second hypothesis
was not supported.
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Figure

3

Actual-Ideal Discrepancy and Negative Affect for High Self Monitors

Chi-square (6, N =135) = 6.30, p = .39, CFI =

.996, RMSEA = .02

30

Figure 6
Actual-Other Discrepancy and Negative Affect for High Self Monitors

Chi-square (4, N = 9 1 ) = 4.059, p = .398, CFI =.998, RMSEA = .03

Discussion
The purpose of the current study was to examine the effects of self-monitoring
and religious self-discrepancies on levels of depression, anxiety, and self-esteem in
Christian individuals. The hypotheses were that low self-monitors with large actuakideal
religious discrepancies (own perspective) would have greater depression and lower selfesteem than low self-monitors without that discrepancy, and secondly, that high selfmonitors with large actuakother religious discrepancies would have greater depression
and lower self-esteem than high self-monitors without that discrepancy.
Due to a better correlation between religious behavior and the remaining four
measures of religious motivation than for quest motivation and the remaining four
religious measures, the decision was made to substitute the religious behavior scale in
place of the quest motivation scale when analyzing the data. Removal of the anxiety
measure on the latent negative affect variable was necessary due to an inadmissible
solution produced by the Amos program.
It was found that all four groups analyzed produced acceptable levels of goodness
of fit for their respective and revised models. A significant relationship was found
between religious self-discrepancies and negative affect for low self-monitors for the
actuakideal discrepancy. A similarly significant relationship was not found for low selfmonitors from the other perspective, thus supporting the hypothesis that low selfmonitors, who are more concerned with meeting their own expectations in religious
beliefs, but who do not do so, are more likely to be depressed and have lower self-esteem
than those who do not meet the expectations of others. These findings appear to be
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consistent with Higgins' theory that individuals with self-discrepancies from their own
ideals tend to be more prone to depressive symptoms. Also, these findings appear to be
consistent with the findings of Gonnerman et al. (2000), in that low self-monitors tend to
have more negative affect when they have actuakideal discrepancies rather than
actuakother discrepancies.
Significant relationships between religious self-discrepancies and negative affect
for high self-monitors were not found for either the own:other or the own:ideal
perspectives. This indicates that although high self-monitors in this sample may show
signs of depression and low self-esteem and may have religious self-discrepancies, these
two states are not related. Whatever causes negative affect in high self-monitors, it is not
religious discrepancies either from one's own ideals or from the expectations of
significant others. These findings are contrary to the results reported by Gonnerman et ak
(2000), in that high self-monitors with self-discrepancies from the other perspective did
have more instances of negative affect, whereas the current study did not find this to be
the case.
In finding a relationship between religious self-discrepancies and negative affect
from the own perspective for low self-monitors, it is then reasonable to assume that this
may be an area to address with the depressed, religious client who seeks treatment from a
clinician. Due to the correlational nature of the data, we cannot assume that a religious
self-discrepancy causes greater depression and lowered self-esteem. It is possible that an
individual who is depressed would choose to abandon the religious beliefs that have been
held up to that point. However, it seems illogical that someone would actually do this.
Instead, it makes more sense that a person who has abandoned the religious beliefs might
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feel some greater sense of depression or lower self-esteem. Regardless of the direction of
causality, where there is a relationship between the two, the clinician has another area
from which to approach treatment.
There are perhaps several reasons as to why the second hypothesis was not
confirmed. One reason may be the wording of the questions on the survey regarding the
other perspective. Our survey asked the participants to report how they thought their
parents and others close to them would want them to believe. We did not address the
concept of anticipated peer approval in the general sense, only from the point of view of
those closest to the participants. It may be that high self-monitors are more concerned
with fulfilling the expectations of a larger peer group or of society in general than just the
expectations of those closest to them. If that is the case, then the questionnaire would
have failed to address this possibility.
A second reason for the lack of confirmation of the second hypothesis may be the
degree to which religion is important to the individuals in this sample. As this sample
was taken at a public, state university where there are typically more diverse attitudes
toward religion, these individuals may not have felt that their religious beliefs were of
such importance to them that not living up to their own or others' expectations would
lead to a propensity for depressive symptoms and lowrer self-esteem, or that having
moved away from close proximity to those significant others, high self-monitors may feel
less pressure to live up to those others' expectations. It is possible that taking a sample
from a private, religiously affiliated institution or from church groups, where the level of
devotion to and importance of religion to any given individual may be higher, might yield
different results than those reported here.
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A third possibility for the lack of relationship between high self-monitors'
religious self-discrepancies and negative affect may be the relative age of the
participants. Perhaps the older and more mature a person grows, the more important
religious beliefs become. If this is the case then perhaps not having lived up to the
expectations one has set in religious beliefs may become more salient and therefore more
likely to result in depressive symptoms and lowered self-esteem.
Fourth, it may simply be that there is no relationship for high self-monitors
between their level of negative affect and the presence of a religious self-discrepancy.
As implied earlier, one of the limitations of this study is the nature of the sample.
A clinical sample may yield a different set of results and may give us a better
understanding of what is needed of the clinician who is approached for treatment from a
clinically depressed individual. Additionally, though Christianity is demographically the
largest religious faith in Western culture, other faiths such as Judaism and Islam
constitute large numbers of individuals, and the particular nature of the Orthodoxy Scale
in specific, as well as the survey in general, did not account for individuals of other
faiths. Future research as to the applicability of these hypotheses to individuals with
other religious beliefs besides Christianity would be prudent. Development of an
orthodoxy scale for these other faiths would be necessary for continuation in this line of
research.
As stated at the beginning of this study, there are countless individuals in the
world who suffer from depression and low self-esteem. Until the last few years, many
clinical psychologists have sought to minimize the effects of religion on a person's
mental health, if not outrightly implicate religion as part of the cause of mental illness.
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Much recent research has indicated that religion can indeed be beneficial to one's mental
health, as well as detrimental. The findings presented in this study lend support to the
notion that religion does indeed play a role in the mental health of individuals, and they
provide clinicians with another point at which to probe the causes of depression in their
religious clients.
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Appendix A
Self-Monitoring Scale
T - True

F - False

1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.
2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that other
will like.
3. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.
4. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no
information.
5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.
6. I would probably make a good actor.
7. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.
8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different
persons.
9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
10. I'm not always the person I appear to be.
11.1 would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please
someone or win their favor.
12.1 have considered being an entertainer.
13.1 have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different
situations.
15. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.

41
16.1 feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should.
17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).
18.1 may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.
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Appendix B
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
1 - Strongly Agree

2 - Agree

3 - Disagree

4 - Strongly Disagree

1.1 feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.
2.1 feel that I have a number of good qualities.
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
4.1 am able to do things as well as most other people.
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
6.1 take a positive attitude toward myself.
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
8.1 wish I could have more respect for myself.
9. I certainly feel useless at times.
10. At times I think I am no good at all.
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Appendix C
Extrinsic Scale of Religious Orientation
1 - Strongly disagree 2 - Disagree 3 - Neutral 4 - Agree 5 - Strongly agree
1. Although I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in
my life.
2. It doesn't matter so much what I believe so longs as I lead a moral life.
3. Although I am a religious person I refuse to let my religious considerations
influence my everyday affairs.
4. A primary reason for my interest in religion is that my church is a congenial
social activity.
5. Occasionally I find it necessary to compromise my religious beliefs in order to
protect my social and economical well-being.
6. One reason for my being a church member is that such membership helps to
establish a person in the community.
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Appendix D
Intrinsic Scale of Religious Orientation
1 - Strongly disagree 2 - Disagree 3 - Neutral 4 - Agree 5 - Strongly agree
1. It is important for me to spend periods of time in private religious thoughts and
meditation.
2. If not prevented by unavoidable circumstances, I attend church.
3. I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life.
4. I read literature about my faith (or church).
5. If I were to join a church group I would prefer to join a Bible study group rather
than a social fellowship.
6. My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life.
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Appendix E
Quest Scale of the Religious Life Inventory
1 - Strongly disagree 2 - Disagree 3 - Neutral 4 - Agree 5 - Strongly agree
1. As I grow and change, I expect my religion also to grow and change.
2. I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs.
3. It might be said that I value my religious doubts and uncertainties.
4. For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious.
5. My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious convictions.
6. There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing.
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Appendix F
Doctrinal Orthodoxy Scale
1 - Strongly disagree 2 - Disagree 3 - Neutral 4 - Agree 5 - Strongly agree
1. I believe God created the universe.
2. I believe Jesus Christ is the Divine Son of God.
3. I believe one must accept Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior to be saved from sin.
4. I believe in life after death.
5. I believe there is a transcendent realm (an "other'" world, not just this world in
which we live).
6. I believe the Bible is the unique authority for God's will.
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Appendix G
Frequency of Religious Behavior
34.1 am a religious person.
a. Strongly disagree
b. Disagree
c. Neutral
d. Agree
e. Strongly Agree
35.1 attend church
a. Never
b. 2-3 times a year
c.

1 time a month

d. 3-4 times a month
e. whenever the doors are open
36.1 read the Bible
a.

Never

b. 2-3 times a year
c. 2-3 times a month
d. 2-3 times a week
e.

daily

37.1 pray
a. Never
b. 2-3 times a year

2-3 times a month
2-3 times a week
daily
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Appendix H
Anxiety Subscale, HSCL
"How have you felt during the past seven days including today?"
1 - Not at all

2 - Some

3 -- A lot

4 - Extreme

1. Nervousness or shakiness inside
2. Trembling
3. Suddenly scared for no reason
4. Feeling fearful
5. Heart pounding or racing
6. Having to avoid certain places or activities because they frighten you
7. Feeling tense or keyed up

50
Appendix I
Depression Subscale, HSCL
"How have you felt during the past seven days including today?"
1 - Not at all

2 - Some

3 - A lot

1. Loss of sexual interest or pleasure
2. Thoughts of ending your life
3. Poor appetite
4. Crying easily
5. A feeling of being trapped or caught
6. Blaming yourself for things
7. Feeling lonely
8. Feeling blue
9. Worrying or stewing about things
10. Feeling no interest in things
11. Feeling hopeless about the future

4 - Extreme

